... external verbal-like modes of representation (such as writing), to have an intentionality derived from the original intentionality of states of mind, and thus explainable in terms of the latter. Intentionality is, according to Millikan, a question of degree: indeed, she rejects Brentano's original motivation for reintroducing the term, which was to establish a criterion for the mental, thus creating "a clean gap" between the mental and the physical. But intentionality, claims Millikan, is not a clean-cut phenomenon: there is no clear distinction between the intentional and the nonintentional (between, say, a word's meaning something and a storm cloud's indicating rain) - just as, in her naturalistic conception, there is no discontinuity between the human mind and the rest of the physical (and biological) universe.1 Intentionality has for Millikan two aspects: one of them has to do, "very generally, with what is Normal or proper"; the other one is related to ...

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